

~~SECRET~~ []

25X1

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee

SECOM-D-098

3 May 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: SECOM Members
Chairman, Physical Security Working Group

FROM: []

Chairman

25X1

SUBJECT: Community Physical Security Against Terrorism and Other
Attacks []

25X1

1. On 19 April 1984, the Director, Intelligence Community Staff (D/ICS), provided the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence preliminary findings on the physical security posture of Community facilities world-wide against terrorism and other attacks. The findings included summary and detailed information on facilities subject to the several major National Foreign Intelligence Programs. Much of this is multicompartmented and not available for general dissemination. The D/ICS observed that:

a. No standards or measurements have been established to provide benchmarks for judging the adequacy/shortfalls/weaknesses in physical security posture:

- (1) There is no clear statement of the threat against facilities;
- (2) Given some level of threat, there is no means to judge adequacy or value of additional protective efforts;
- (3) The randomness of the terrorist threat complicates calculation of the probability that any facility will be attacked; and
- (4) Increased protective measures may raise the profiles of some facilities to unacceptable levels.

b. Host/tenant relationships complicate any solution.

c. The Community may not be doing all it can within budgetary levels to identify shortfalls and begin corrective action. []

25X1

~~SECRET~~ []

25X1

SECRET [REDACTED]

25X1

2. The D/ICS also advised that he was referring this matter to the Security Committee to "undertake a complete review of the physical security posture of the Community with primary focus on terrorist and other physical attacks" and to recommend "Community-wide goals and standards to be achieved to improve our posture." [REDACTED]

25X1

3. The Chairman, Physical Security Working Group, is requested to develop a proposed plan of action with milestones for the SECOM on this matter, for report to the SECOM at its June meeting. SECOM members are requested to provide information and support on this matter to [REDACTED]. Members are requested to provide [REDACTED] copies of or references to any threat statements known to them and copies of or references to any policy or procedural guidance bearing on physical security against terrorist attacks of U.S. facilities worldwide which house intelligence personnel and activities. Also, members are requested to identify to [REDACTED] points of contact in their departments or agencies who have experience in this area and who could assist in this important SECOM effort. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

25X1

cc: DD/ICS
D/PBS/ICS

SECRET [REDACTED]

2

25X1

SECRET

PLAN OF ACTION - PHYSICAL SECURITY/TERRORISM

25X1

MILESTONES (1984)

ACTIONS

JUNE

JULY

AUG

SEP

OCT

NOV

DEC

1. Establish Task Group (CIA, State, NSA, OSD)
2. Review available intel/policy/guidance
3. Identify facilities by type,
4. Identify countries where facilities are located
5. List countries in order of probability/susceptibility to attack
6. Within listed countries, break down location of facilities by area (urban, suburban, rural)
7. Within listed countries/areas, list facilities in order of probability/susceptibility to attack
8. Compile list of protective measures to counter attack
9. Produce Report with Recommendations

25X1

Classified by: DCI
Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

Enclosure (2)

SECRET

SECRET

DRAFT PLAN OF ACTION

ISSUE. Community Physical Security Against Terrorism and Other Attacks

25X1

BACKGROUND. By SECOM-D-098 of 3 May 1984, the Chairman, SECOM tasked the Chairman, PSWG with developing a proposed plan of action and milestones (POA&M) concerning "a complete review of the physical security posture of the Community with primary focus on terrorist and other physical attacks" and to recommend "Community-wide goals and standards to be achieved to improve our posture."

25X1

The same tasking memorandum stated that:

- No standards or measurements have been established to provide benchmarks for judging the adequacy/weaknesses in physical security posture
- There is no clear statement of threat against facilities.
- Given some level of threat, there is no means to judge adequacy or value of additional protective efforts
- The randomness of the terrorist threat complicates calculation of the probability that any facility will be attacked
- Increased protective measures may raise the profiles of some facilities to unacceptable levels
- Host/tenant relationships complicate any solution

25X1

The "Attacks against Community facilities" concept includes:

- "Terrorist" groups of varying size and composition with varying levels of capability
- Mob assaults of varying size and composition with or without local government assistance and/or connivance
- Internal assaults mounted by local/foreign nationals authorized to be in, on or in proximity to Community facilities

Classified by: DCI
Declassify on: OADR

SECRET

Enclosure (3)

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

- Attacks of a criminal nature ☐

25X1

Excluded are attacks on Community facilities by the armed forces of a host nation ☐

25X1

DISCUSSION: The variety of Community facilities by type and location is such as to very probably preclude the establishment of a rigid standard for physical protective measures. Profile considerations would, in any case, require a waiver provision in any such standard ☐

25X1

It may nevertheless be possible, by reviewing all available current and historical intelligence data dealing with terrorist and other attacks against US facilities to:

- List countries (or geographic areas) where physical attack might be more likely to occur (recognizing the terrorist's opportunity to strike at will anywhere)
- List US facilities by type which, by their physical or apparent nature, might be more susceptible to attack
- Correlate countries and types of facilities which should receive priority attention (specific on-site surveys by the cognizant agency/department and follow-on specific physical security upgrade recommendations)
- Compile a list of available physical security measures which cognizant agencies/departments can use to selectively achieve levels of physical protection commensurate with local conditions/vulnerabilities ☐

25X1

Current threat and policy documents will also have to be reviewed to ensure that PSWG recommendations will be consistent with established national policy. ☐

25X1

ACTION:

1. Establish a Task Group consisting of knowledgeable personnel from those agencies/departments most concerned with physical attack against Community facilities (e.g., CIA, State, NSA, OSD) and others, as appropriate to develop the POA&M for delivery to the Chairman, SECOM by the June 1984 meeting of the SECOM. ☐

25X1

2. Complete the effort if the POA&M is approved by the SECOM. ☐

25X1

SECRET

SECRET